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THE GREAT DELUSION

Apostolos Ch. Frangos

Greek Association of Scientists for the Scientific Truth
Athens, Greece

ABSTRACT

The involvement of science with metaphysical doctrines for purposes Irrelevant to the aims

of science is one of the most important problems in contemporary education and general
information. It is necessary to reveal the delusion that evolutionists and materialists
have created by presenting their metaphysical doctrines as scientific fact. This paper
makes a brief but thorough analysis of the issue and presents a practical proposal for an
effective confrontation.

Since the last century, the rapid and fascinating development of the physical or empirical

sciences as well as technological achievement has provided the opportunity to use the name
of science for purposes of supporting philosophical Ideas and metaphysical aims which are

out of the scope, competency, and capability of empirical science.
BASIC ASSUMPTIONS IN SCIENCE

Let us begin with the fundamental principles in any human activity (and therefore in sci

ence) which form the basis of such assumptions.

The basic premises for the existence of

science Itself and any scientific activity are as follows:
a)
b)

c)
d)
e)

The self-consciousness of our real existence.
The external natural world 1s real.

Our natural senses give us a reasonable, reliable perception of the external

world.

The natural world Is orderly and reproducible and therefore is subject to and

worthy of systematic investigation.

The laws of logic are valid.

These five assumptions are not pure philosophical assertions, but are mainly empirical

ascertainments independent of any philosophical attempt to explain them or to question
them.

Because science is by definition, by its nature and purposes, generally accepted as a human
empirical attempt to learn more about the natural world, these five admissions are fundamen
tal necessities inherent to science, since without them there is no way to define any kind
of scientific activity as a human pursuit.

It is possible, of course, to question these fundamental assumptions. But, in such a case,
science is automatically disallowed as a human activity; in its place is set any loose,
unconditional thought or proposal, thus engaging in philosophical, not scientific, activity.
By definition, science means the agreement concerning some basic, self-evident, reasonable
principles. Without such an agreement (explicit or Implicit), science loses any meaning and
becomes merely a philosophical or metaphysical belief. Professor Or. J. Mannois says:
Science deals in what can be experienced with the five senses. It Is an empirical and
experimental activity. This principle is the very strength of science. It is at the heart
of science to be concerned with making observations of the world.
both begins and ends there.(1)

The scientific activity

THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD OF RESEARCH

Settling the basic assumptions In science, the scientific method Is a next important step.
The scientific method, say Drs. Wayne Frair and Persival Davis in a brief and very compre
hensive ana1ysis(2), is a hybrid of two main forms of thought—deduction and Induction.

Deduction Is probably the roost common form of inferential logic in which the necessary consequences of a fact are determined.
Induction is the means by which we Interpret obser
vations and assess their significance.
It is the process of formulating generalizations.
The drawback of induction is that it can be used too subjectively.
It is easy to make erro
neous generalizations, especially when they are drawn from insufficient data.
Yet induction
1s a cornerstone of the scientific method. The only way we obtain the raw material of
reason Is to make observations and generalize them.
Such tentative generalizations are called hypotheses.

An hypothesis 1s a proposed explana

tion for some problem or phenomenon that catches the attention of the scientist. A predic
tion 1s a logical consequence of that hypothesis.
Predictions are validated by attempted
observation. To generate the necessary observation, scientists usually design controlled

experiments.

The characteristics of a genuine hypothesis that distinguish it most from dogma on one hand
and speculation on the other, are that a hypothesis 1s both tentative and faisifiable.
Because the essence of a scientific hypothesis 1s Its falsifiability, a hypothesis that is
proposed in such a way that it cannot be discredited even If it 1s untrue, lies outside the
scope of the scientific method.
It could be true 1n fact, but it is scientifically undemonstrable and it 1s not really a scientific hypothesis at all.
Such proposals are usually
called unfalsifiable hypotheses and are therefore metaphysical postulates.

To be useful as a hypothesis, Ors. Frair and Davis add that It must be falsifiable and it

must suggest predictions of what will be observed if the hypothesis is false.
The only way
science can progress is negatively—by paring away hypotheses that can be proven false by
falsifying their predictions.
We must always remember that the scientific method works in real time.
It is impossible or
exceedingly difficult to establish historical events or their meaning in the domain of
empirical science by the scientific method, because retroduced facts are usually open to a
variety of interpretations.
It is not possible to obtain scientific knowledge of these
natural events of the past.

Professor Sir Karl Popper(3) deals extensively with falsification as an essential element
in science.

"The purpose of science as an activity is to form conceptual generalizations about the many
particulars of empirical experience," says Dr. J. Mannois.
It is concerned with both par
ticular observations and with general concepts, i.e., to form Ideas about these observations

(hypotheses, theories or mere guesses).

He makes a careful examination of scientific acti

vity and points out three important processes:

Discovery, Prediction and Confirmation.

The process of discovery is an activity moving from the level of particular observations to
general theories.
Having arrived at a tentative theory or working hypothesis, it remains to
test its truth.
The first step of that test is the process we call "prediction." Because

most theories are of a general character, prediction 1s usually a process of moving from

general to particular.
Predictions are the observable consequences of the theory. They
follow from a theory by the logic of deduction and proceed according to a precise and a
rigid set of rules that we all use every day in our own thinking.
It would almost seem that

we are born with rules of deduction stamped In our minds.

premises are true, the conclusion must be true.

In any valid deduction, if the

This element of necessity applies then to

predictions drawn from theories.
No prediction can ever test a theory unless an experiment
is performed.
Therefore, it is necessary for science to turn to the domain of sense
experience as Its ultimate criterion of truth.
Here we must point out that the logic of

confirmation 1s Inductive while the logic of falsification is actually deductive, while
this logic of falsification is deductively valid, the logic of confirmation (induction) is
deductively fallacious.
It consists of the fallacy of affirming the consequent.
Dr. Mannois, analyzing the process of induction, i.e., the process of using particulars to

support a general statement, faces the problem of unexaniined cases and leads to the classic
problem of induction and concludes that there is a subtle but very profound uncertainty in
the theories of science which results from the method by which they are formed.
The problem

of induction seems Inescapable.
Thus science, not unlike religion, appears to rest ulti
mately on faith.
Scientists either consciously accept the assumption that the certainty of
physical laws, and much more their theories, rest ultimately on faith, or else ignore the
issue and accept the assumption unconsciously.
Robert Herrmann(4) asserts:
One of the absolute requirements of the scientific method and
the logic employed is that a physical hypothesis that can be indirectly verified only, can-

not be absolutely demonstrated as "true in reality." All scientific Inquiry that deals with
matters of fact and Is based upon indirect evidence is probable in character.
Herrmann
adds: There is one unfortunate aspect of speculative theories that does tend to force a
scientist to accept a theory as "fact" at least for a while.
History is replete with
examples where prominent scientists have greatly embarrassed themselves by such an absolute
acceptance of a theory as fact, only to discover at a later date that certain verifiable
Implications were proven false.
Or they have simply accepted a theory as fact since, for
political or philosophical reasons, the majority of their colleagues have accepted this
popular theory as fact.
Although It is very interesting and useful to say something about the Intrinsic uncertain
ties in science, I omit this topic because of lack of time and space.
What I want to emphasize here is the conclusion that Dr. Mannois mentions—that science is
exclusively concerned with the empirical world of sense experience.
Scientific knowledge is
about the sensible world; it originates in sense experience and ultimately is tested against
the standard of sense experience.

Another serious point mentioned by Dr. Mannois is the objectivity of the scientific
knowledge which 1s founded, as we have seen, in sense experience.
All scientific findings
must necessarily be open to investigation and test by other members of the scientific com
munity.
Science falls to be the objective end because, in spite of the fact that pure nonsubjectivity is not a feature of any kind of knowledge, scientific knowledge will be
inter-subjectively testable and based on the distinction between repeatable and unique
events.
It is interesting to note what Drs. Ch. Thaxton, U. Bradley and R. 01sen(5) say on
scientific theories:
it is widely appreciated that from its beginning modern science has
been concerned with findings and describing orderly patterns in the recurring events of
nature.
To do this a well-defined method 1s used.
Data are gathered through observation
and experimentation and theories are proposed to explain the behavior or operation of the
phenomena investigated.
Theories only work If there 1s some pattern of recurring events
against which theories may be checked and falsified if they are false.
Because there are
recurring patterns of natural events we can test theories about them.
They call such
theories "operational theories," for these theories are concerned with the recurring pheno
mena of nature.

On the other hand, an understanding of the universe (and the natural world in general)
Includes some singular events, such as its origin.
Unlike the recurring operations of the

universe, origins cannot be repeated for experimental test.
won't repeat themselves for the testing of our theories.

The beginnings of life just

In the customary language of science, theories of origins cannot be falsified by empirical
test, as can operational

theories.

Hypotheses of origins (generally dealing with unrepeatable singular events) are not empiri
cally testable or falsifiable since the datum (namely the origin) needed for experimental
test Is unavailable.
The best we can ever hope to achieve with wrong ideas about origins is
to render them implausible.
Theories of origins and, generally, theories about first and
last causes must be distinctly defined and separated from empirical science.
The lack of

such a distinction today and the minimal recognition of the fundamental difference between
theories of origin and operational scientific theories is one of the main reasons that most
of today's scientists misconstrue materialistic world views and the theory of evolution as
"scientific."
The validity and acceptance of any theory about origins, or about first and last causes,
which is purely a metaphysical theory, depends on the preference of each individual and not
on scientific evidences or results.
It Is really a pure act of metaphysical faith and not
of scientific knowledge.
The origins perspective of metaphysical /natural istic evolutionism is spontaneous generation

(abiogenesis); of theism the perspective Is special Creation.

two fundamental metaphysical

The conflict between those

alternatives and interpretations of the nature of reality is

not, as naturalists like to present, merely a conflict between science and the supernatural

(religion), but exclusively between two metaphysical assumptions, as demonstrated already.

SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND METAPHYSICAL ASSUMPTIONS
It is of special importance here to clarify further the distinction between scientific
knowledge and metaphysical assumptions by defining the boundaries and limits of scientific
knowledge.
Although this matter Is one of the most critical issues in epistemoiogy, we will
present only some main points briefly.

Professor Dr. A. Tsirintanis made a very Interesting analysis of this issue (6)
Summarizing his remarks it Is evident that there Is a barrier that confines our knowledge
of reality within certain (albeit always expanding) bounds. There is a barrier that exists

a "fence" that limits our knowledge and which, although 1t Is constantly receding, can neveV
be removed due to the limitations of the human mind. Any proposition or question or
hypothesis that, due to Its nature cannot be verified either at present or in the future by
science through observation and/or experimentation, Is not a scientific but a metaphysical

Issue.

It cannot be proven nor tested because it lies beyond the capacity of the human mind

to verify or refute t. But we must be careful at this point. The fact that I do not "see"
something (says Tsirintanis) is not a proof that 1t does not exist. We have every right to
say that we know nothing about realities which cannot be scientifically tested, but we have
no right to say we know there Is no reality beyond that which can be checked by science for
no scientific test has ever proven the truth or falsity of such an argument. It is an argu
ment supported only by the fallacy of human omniscience, according to which man knows
positively everything, and whatever Is not known or knowable by man simply does not exist

However, both the history of science and everyday experience reveal new realities which were
positively" unknown before; therefore, according to this materialistic way of thinkinq

we are being led to the absurd conclusion of their non-existence.

9l

The philosophical doctrine of materialism asserts that sense and empiricism are its fun

damental frame of acceptance. But, although materialists put forward this assertion thev
deny it at the same time because they reject the worldwide human experience expressed in the
mpeccable reason ng: "For every house is builded by some man; but he that built all things
is God (Heb. 3:4). In other words, materialism contradicts its basis of acceptance when it

tries to support itself on the absurdity of not accepting what sense and enpiridsm conf"™

to man
Materialism refuses itself! whereas it claims to adopt only the data of sense and
empiricism, immediately it denies them, since rejection of human experience is the assertion
of the spontaneous (without any Creator) creation ex nihilo of our natural world.

So materialists claim they are dealing with science when, in fact, they are dealing with
metaphysics without suspecting it-without knowing that they present their metaphysical
doctrines (spontaneous ex nihilo creation of the world) as if 1t were scientifically proven.
And jthi£ is the great an? most Important fallacy: the great deception of contemporary man.

According to Professor Sir Peter Medawar, recipient of the ig60 Nobel Prize in Medicine

there is an Intrinsic, built-in limitation upon the growth of scientific understanding. It
is a logica limitation that turns on a "Law of Conservation of Information," i.e., no process of logical reasoning—no mere act of mind or computer-programmable operation—can

enlarge the Information content of the axioms and premises or observation statements from

wnicn

it proceeds.(7)

The law of conservation of information makes it clear that from observational statements or

descriptive laws having only empirical furniture there is no process of reasoning by which

we may derive theorans having to do with first and last causes.

To continue, a distinction must be drawn between questions of the kind science can answer
and questions belonging to some other realm of discourse to which we must turn if they are
to be answered at all. My contention in the discussion so far is that it is logically out
side the competence of science to answer questions having to do with first and last causes.

Ralph Andl states, "If we conceive of science as somehow involving a search for the laws of

nature, say, like the law of gravity, or the laws of planetary motion, then what are the
laws of ultimate origins?"(8)

The singular, historical event of the generation of the cosmos is more of a metaphysical

concern than a scientific one.

This should be especially clear when it is recalled that

science, among other things, relies on the Inductive method to derive laws of nature which

were not formerly known.

gins?

How could this method possibly apply 1n the study of ultimate ori

Professor Dr. John Moore(9) says about the problem of origins in science that since opera
tional science (according to the terms of Drs. Ch. Thaxton et al) involves the gathering of
data through experiment and observation, leading to the formulaTion of theories which are
valid if they are, among others, tested indirectly by repeated observation and experiment.
Discussions of origins problems (particularly including the origins of life) are not part of

operational

science.

This is characteristic of what Dr. Henry Morris writes on this matter:

r

It must also be

emphasized that it is impossible to prove scientifically any particular concept of origins

to be true. This is obvious from the fact that the essence of the scientific method Is
experimental observation and repeatability. This means that, though 1t Is Important to have
a philosophy of origins, it can only be achieved by faith, not by sight. That is no argu
ment against it, however. Every step we take in life Is a step of faith. Even the pragmatist who insists he will believe only what he can see believes that his pragmatism 1s the
best philosophy, although he can't prove 1t. He also believes 1n Invisible atoms and in
such abstractions as the future. Furthermore, it is clear that neither evolution nor
creation is, in the proper sense, either a scientific theory or a scientific hypothesis
Though people might speak of the "theory of evolution" or the "theory of creation " such
terminology is Imprecise. This is because neither can be tested. A valid scientific

hypothesis must be capable of being formulated experimentally, such that the experimental
results either confirm or reject its validity. A more proper approach is to think in terms
of two scientific models—the evolutionary model and the creationist model. A "model" is a
conceptual framework, an orderly system of thought, within which one tries to correlate
observable data and even to predict data. When neither can be proved, the decision between
the two cannot be solely objective. (10)

Also, Or. Duane Gish(ll) underlines the fact that neither creation nor evolution has ever
been observed by human witnesses. Neither is subject to the experimental method and neither
is capable of falsification. It is evident then that neither evolution nor creation quali
fies as a scientific theory.

He mentions, besides others, clear acknowledgment and confessions by distinguished evolu
tionists that evolution fails to qualify as a scientific theory since it cannot be subjected
to experimental test. Thus, it is outside empirical science. It 1s axiomatic in nature.
Another serious point to clarify is what materialists call "naturalistic explanation." Dr.
Karl Fezer(l2) remarks: If by this expression they mean that science must be empirical and
that ultimate recourse, with which no one could disagree, Is the sense data, then they are
self-contradictory because they do not admit that unique historical events in the natural
world are outside any empirical search and test, hence are excluded from scientific investi
gation.

The inherent nature and aims of natural science and its existing capability are to deal with
the reproducible empirical world. Everything In the empirical world which Is not reprodu
cible at least 1n Its main essential and typical characteristics and components is excluded
from scientific research. The only way to approach these unique singular events or pheno
mena of the natural world not reproducible at the time of investigation Is the formulation
of various tentative explanatory hypotheses or theories which in turn cannot give any cer
tain knowledge since they may be reasonable yet contradictory to each other because of their
compulsory metaphysical or religious bases.

Thus the argument that the majority of scientists should agree and adopt a materialistic/

metaphysical system such as the theory of evolution is ridiculous. The criterion of scien
tific research and validity is not a statistical referendum among scientists, but objec
tively what can be subjected to scientific research by the scientific methods of testing.

Or. Bert Thompson(13) adds: Truth isn't determined by popular opinion or majority vote.
This is a common ploy on the part of evolutionists. In logic the argument is termed "ad
populum"—the appeal to the people.
CONCLUSION

Due to the fact that the theory of evolution has inherently a metaphysical nature and
character, it abuses the name of science for purposes outside the aims and work of science.

Exposing this reality, In my opinion, should be the most important aim and pursuit of every
creationist. It will help to eliminate the prevailing illusion and delusion that the theory
of evolution 1s scientific.

In order to realize effectively such an effort, I propose a draft of a declaration which
should be circulated and signed by as many scientists as possible 1n the USA and abroad.

I have formulated a proposed text of this declaration as brief and explicit as possible (I
know a similar declaration made by Dr. R. Kofhal of the Creation-Science Research Center,
which, although it 1s quite good, is rather extensive, involving questionable matters and
expositions which are not acceptable to many scientific creationists) so that any unpreju
diced scientist, irrelevant of his metaphysical or religious views, can adopt and sign it:

DECLARATION

1.
The rapid and fascinating development and achievements of the natural sciences have
provided the opportunity to use the name of science for purposes of supporting philosophical
ideas and metaphysical aims which are outside the scope and competency of natural sciences.

2.
Beyond any philosophical definition or disputation, it is generally agreed that the
pursuits of the natural sciences are, on one hand, the systematic description, search and
study of various repeatable and reproducible natural phenomena and events in order to iden
tify interrelations and interactions between them so as to formulate general rules for their
appearance and forecast, acquiring more and better knowledge about the natural world and, on
the other hand, the possible uses of such knowledge for practical and useful applications
for the benefit of mankind.

3.

Basic admissions and necessary conditions for the existence and realization of the

a)

The consciousness that we are real

b)

The external

c)

Our natural senses give us a reasonable, reliable perception of the external world.

aims of natural

d)
e)

sciences are:

(self-consciousness of our real existence).

natural world is real.

The natural world is orderly and reproducible and so worthy of systematic investi

gation.

The laws of logic are valid.

4.
Every proposal and postulate In the form of hypothesis, theory or model which aims
for better understanding or interpreting of a natural phenomenon or event must be consistent
or inconsistent with the facts of the real natural world.
Therefore, in order that any pro
posal, postulate, hypothesis or theory to lead to and furnish scientific knowledge and con
sequently to have any objective scientific value, it is absolutely necessary that it be
subject to critical tests for verification or falsification by the existing empirical ways
of observation and/or experimentation at any time of appropriate research.

5.
Proposals, hypotheses, theories or models which are well known in advance, without
any doubt, that are impossible of falsification with the empirical testing ways of obser
vation and/or experimentation due to their inherent objective incapability for such testing
are not scientific.
They are only philosophical or metaphysical a priori assumptions which

cannot provide a scientific knowledge of the natural world.
capability and competency of the natural

sciences.

Sueh~assumptions are beyond the

6. While personal rights of freedom of thought in philosophical, metaphysical or reli
gious faith and doctrines and their public expression by any means are generally recognized
and respected, they are absolutely unacceptable if presented as scientific facts or deduc
tions.

7.
Any attempt to present philosophical, religious, or metaphysical doctrines as
results and facts of scientific research is unjustified and becomes a dangerous violation,
adulteration and forgery of the goals and aims of science.
Such inappropriate metaphysical
insertions are misleading because they look forward to purposes irrelevant to science and
consequently should be completely rejected from the scientific field of research.
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